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Abstract  
Defining the factors that give rise to National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) has the potential to 
better understand information security in a global context. Considering the large number of countries 
that have developed NCSS, the paper seeks to define common motives that enable NCSS development 
to be understood as public policy phenomenon.  In order to achieve this, the paper employs qualitative 
coding to review the NCSS of 54 countries.  Descriptive coding is used to distill common motives, and 
then pattern coding is employed to develop themes as a way to explain the development and adoption 
of cyber security strategies by governments. The themes are National Security, Jurisprudence, and 
Politics. Enabling greater clarity in the motives that lead to cyber security strategies provides 
policymakers and scholars with additional insights into the development of initiatives that aim to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented by cyberspace while mitigating its security threats.  
Keywords Cyber Space, Cyber Security, Cyber Security Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy Motives, 
National Cyber Security Strategy, Information Security. 
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1 Introduction 
The socio-technical factors that shape the effectiveness or otherwise of security policies has been the 
focus of information systems (IS) research. Examples of this can be found in developing information 
security policy that seeks to define an effective information security policy requirement in an 
organisation (Flowerday and Tuyikeze 2016). One little-explored aspect to the social-technical 
dimensions of information security policies, however, are the effects that national policies play in 
shaping the information security environment. Described more generally as national cyber security 
strategy (NCSS) the factors that lead to its development are arguably a powerful shaping force that 
enables information security to be understood as a global phenomenon.   
Given the pervasive nature of information and communication technology (ICT) throughout the world 
an ongoing issue for policy makers is to how best define cyber security strategy that works for the 
benefits of government, industry and civil society. An effective cyber security strategy seeks to balance 
accepted norms of a country with the opportunities presented by the internet. On the one hand, the 
internet, as a key enabler of cyberspace, is considered a disruptive technology that calls into question 
many accepted norms in military affairs, public policy, business and civil society (Lyytinen and Rose 
2003). On the other hand, Government must balance this concern with the nature of the internet 
which is to preserve the openness and free flow of the information (Arsneault et al. 2005; OECD 2012). 
This condition may have considerable implications for country’s future. While a strict security policy 
ensures stability, it may also reduce the potential benefits of the information age (Arsneault et al. 
2005).  
With the proliferation of NCSS it has become increasingly difficult to perceive an overall 
understanding of cyber security development as a public policy phenomenon. For example, the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE 2015) and the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA 2013) note that there are more than 50 countries that have 
developed their own National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) (Klimburg 2012). Given the various 
motives and the range of NCCS, it is necessary for this research to pose the question “why do countries 
create their National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS)?”. To that end, the research strives to 
understand motives behind the creation of cyber security strategy to enable a better understanding of 
the NCSS as a shaping force in a nation’s information security environment. 
2 NCSS: Definition and Challenge 
2.1 Definition 
The history of the term “cyberspace” stretches back over many decades.  The term “cyber” emerged 
seven decades ago (Ottis and Lorents 2010).  Wiener (1948, pp. 144–154) coined the term 
“cybernetics” to describe “interactions between humans (or animals) with a machine that can 
provide an alternative environment”. The term "cyberspace" was first used in early 1980’s which 
described as “a graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every computer in the 
human system.” (Gibson 1984). Since then, the term has entered common usage, including the study 
of information system's study (Ottis and Lorents 2010). 
Often, the definition of cyber security and information security are used interchangeably (E. Luiijf et 
al. 2013, p. 6). However, von Solms and van Niekerk (2013) attempts to clarify differences between 
these two terms. Information security deals with the protection of information as an asset, in physical 
or non-physical form; whereas, cyber security deals with the protection of with both informational and 
non-informational assets through the ICT infrastructure (von Solms and van Niekerk 2013). From an 
information systems perspective, this division appears as a misleading one when considering the work 
of information systems professionals.  This is because the information assets that von Solms and van 
Niekerk (2013) seek to distinguish from infrastructure is, in reality, part and parcel of such 
infrastructure. In much the same way information systems may be essential to running a banking 
enterprise such systems are also fundamental to ensuring the proper working of a dam or power 
station as amply demonstrated by the software worm Stuxnet that was used to disrupt the Iranian 
nuclear program (Shakarian et al. 2013).  
Bearing in mind that the distinction that von Solms and van Niekerk makes does have some veracity, 
we define National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) as “a careful plan or method of protection both 
informational and non-informational assets through the ICT infrastructure for achieving a 
particular national goals usually over a long period of time” (E. Luiijf et al. 2013; Merriam-Webster 
2016a; von Solms and van Niekerk 2013). Using this definition, it can be understood that the NCSS 
seeks to address a nation’s goals which have implications for its government, businesses and civil 
society.   
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Azmi, Tibben, Win 
2016, Wollongong  Motives behind Cyber Security Strategy Development  
  3 
2.2 Challenges on Creating NCSS 
The broader motivations for NCSS development appertain to a number of factors namely: the nature of 
the internet, stakeholder representation, cyberspace borders, and dynamic changes. While NCSS 
should seek to preserve the openness and free flow of information of the internet, it should not 
undermine the national interest (Klimburg 2012, pp. 35–42; OECD 2012). Inevitably, creating the 
NCSS requires issues of economics, politics, culture and international relations to be balanced with 
internet-age ideals of openness and free information flow (Arsneault et al. 2005; Klimburg 2012, pp. 
35–42; OECD 2012). One does not need to look too far to find a nexus between cyber security and 
tensions in international relations. For example, the Stuxnet attack mentioned previously was judged 
to be a US state-sponsored attack designed to upset Iran's nuclear program as well as its leadership.  
Tension between Australia and Indonesia in 2013 over Australia's National Security Agency's 
monitoring of phone calls by Indonesian politicians and their families is another example. (Reddick et 
al. 2015). While countries that limit the free information flow attempts to ensure political stability, 
they potentially reduce benefits that can be gained in the information age (Arsneault et al. 2005). 
Another challenge in defining cyber security strategy is how to achieve representation for all parts of 
society ranging from the private sector to government to civil society (Klimburg 2012; E. Luiijf et al. 
2013). From a government’s perspective, there are benefits in creating e-government services in the 
delivery of services as well as improving their government capacity (Stier 2015). Civil society has been 
an active user of cyber space to coordinate action leading to the slogan “think globally, act locally”. 
The ability to maintain anonymity and confidentiality makes the Internet a potentially transformative 
medium (Seebruck 2015), such as in political activism (Al-Rawi 2014). The private sector’s use of 
cyberspace to enable electronic transactions, promotes e-commerce, e-banking, and e-advertising 
(Porter 2001). Therefore, cyber security strategy needs to account for varied and legitimate use while 
ensuring criminal activity is kept in check (Souza 2013). 
One key challenge in creating cyber security strategy is defining borders in cyber space. Borders are 
important in delineating jurisdictions in which law is enforced (Johnson and Post 1996). Depending 
on which lens is adopted different sets of boundaries are brought into focus, and, by implication, 
different perceptions of jurisdictions (Cottim 2008; Finklea 2012; Johnson and Post 1996; Motlagh 
2015). Some argue that cyberspace should remain borderless in which no one should claim or rule 
cyberspace on the basis that no physical interactions take place (Barlow 1996; Johnson and Post 1996). 
However, globalisation and technology has fostered the change on viewing the jurisdiction and border 
not only based on the geographical boundary but across the national border (Finklea 2012). Therefore, 
several conventional jurisdictions, such as territorial jurisdiction, personality jurisdiction, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction, and “turf” boundary”, are proposed which may be 
applied in seeking the cyberspace jurisprudence (Cottim 2008; Finklea 2012; Tehrani and Manap 
2013). Owing to these different interpretations cyber security strategy needs to deal with defining an 
appropriate context in which security can be effectively addressed.  
The last challenge in developing cyber security strategy seeks to deal with changing environments. The 
internet, as a key enabler of cyberspace, is considered a disruptive technology (Lyytinen and Rose 
2003) that calls into question many accepted norms in military affairs, public policy, business and civil 
society. Developing a strategy to address the uncertainty of innovation is not straightforward. There is 
a challenge of creating a good strategy within the uncertainty of disruptive technological change. Thus, 
the cyber security strategy needs to account for future innovations inside the cyberspace.  
In summary, countries generally need NCSS to secure their national cyberspace. However, defining 
NCSS has challenges. First, there are various perspectives when defining cyber security (E. Luiijf et al. 
2013). Second, some aspects need to be considered by the government, such as internal and external 
environment (GCSCC 2014; ITU 2012). Considering there are different challenges posed by every 
country, there is a need to better define the motives that lead to the creation of NCSS.  
3 Methodology 
This research uses the grounded theory paradigm to synthesise motives behind cyber security strategy 
throughout the world. Grounded theory aims to generalise concepts (and theory) from empirical 
results (Saldaña 2009; Scott and Glaser 1967). Figure 3-1 shows the steps taken in this paper to 
synthesise national cyber security strategy (NCSS) documents. 
The first phase described our response to the research question: why do countries create National 
Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS)?, which was to collect the relevant literature using our defined search 
strategy (NVIVO 2015; Saldaña 2009). The search strategy included the keywords “National Cyber 
Security Strategy/Policy <Country>”, “Information Security Strategy/Policy <Country>”, “Digital 
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Security Strategy/Policy <Country>” followed by the Country specifics on the search engines Google 
and DuckDuckGo. The main source of NCSSs were found from CCDCOE’s and ENISA’s website 
(CCDCOE 2015; ENISA 2013). We applied inclusion and exclusion criteria in our literature 
classification.  Primary documents that related to strategy documents referring to cyber space such as, 
for example, national security strategies and national security doctrines were included.  Due to 
resource limitations we excluded literature that was not in English. The task of ensuring accurate 
translations of non-English documents into English was beyond available resources for this research.  
 
Figure 3-1 A Streamlined of the Research adapted from (NVIVO 2015; Saldaña 2009) 
The application of the literature search yielded 64 NCSS from 54 countries (see Table 3-1). Literature 
classification sometimes yielded two different examples of NCSS from the one country (i.e. Austria, 
Netherland, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States). Publication dates of these documents 
ranged from 2003-2015. 
Table 3-1 List of Countries  
Asia Africa Europe 
Afghanistan (Wafa 2014) – AFG  
Bangladesh (BG 2014) – BGD  
Israel (PMO 2011) – ISR  
India (MCIT 2013a) – IND  
Japan (GoJ 2015) – JPN 
Jordan (MICT 2012) –JOR 
Pakistan (Syed 2014) –PAK 
Qatar (MICT 2013) –QAT 
Republic of Korea (MOND 2009) 
– ROK 
Russian Federation (MoD 2011; 
PRF 2000; RF 2013) – RUS 
Saudi Arabia  (MCIT 2013b) – 
SAU 
Singapore (IDA 2013) – SGP 
Turkey (MTMAC 2013) –TUR 
Egypt (MCIT 2012) – EGY 
Ghana (MOC 2014) – GHA 
Kenya (MICT 2014) – KEN 
Mauritius (MTCI 2015) – MUS 
Morocco (MCINET 2013) – MAR 
Nigeria (SSS 2014a, 2014b) – NGA 
South Africa (GoSA 2011) – ZAF 
Uganda (NITA-U 2014) –UGA 
Austria  (BKA 2012, 2013) – AUT 
Belgium (ACOS STRAT 2014) – 
BEL 
Czech Republic (NCKB 2015) – CZE  
Croatia (Skendžić 2014) – HRV 
Cyprus (OCECPR 2012) – CYP 
Estonia (MEAC 2014) – Lithuania 
(GoL 2011) – LTU 
Montenegro  (GoM 2013) – MNE 
Netherlands (MoD 2012a; NCSC 
2013) –  NLD 
Norway (GARCIA 2012) – NOR 
Poland (MADISA 2013) – POL 
Serbia (MOD 2010) – SRB 
Slovakia (GoS 2008) – SVK 
Spain (DOND 2013) – ESP 
Sweden (GS 2015) – SWE 
Switzerland (DOD 2012) – CHE 
United Kingdom (HMG 2010) – 
GBR   
America 
Brazil (MoD 2012b) – BRA 
Canada (GoC 2013; MPS 2010) – 
CAN 
Colombia (NCESP 2011) – COL 
Trinidad & Tobago (IMCCS 2012) – 
TTO 
United States of America  (DoD 2015; 
WH 2003; WH 2011)– USA 
Oceania 
Australia  (AG 2009) – AUS 
New Zealand (NZG 2011) – NZL 
To synthesise the information in these documents two phases of coding followed – first cycle coding; 
and the second cycle coding. Qualitative coding generally seeks to establish an analytic process with a 
progressive refinement that is transparent and repeatable (Saldaña 2009, p. 45). This study adopted 
an approach called “descriptive coding” for its first cycle coding method and “pattern coding” for its 
second cycle coding method (Saldaña 2009). Descriptive coding as a first cycle coding method is 
distinguished by the use of individual words (nouns) or short phrases from the literature to create 
topics that are used to characterise tracts of qualitative data (Saldaña 2009, p. 70). This process of 
coding is repeatable which is refined several times until codes describe the specific common concept. 
Pattern coding in the second cycle is distinguished by techniques that explain or infer an emergent 
theme in the data (Saldaña 2009, p. 152). It aims to transform understanding of contextual data into 
generalised concepts (Saldaña 2009). In order to synthesise a large amount of data into particular 
concepts, the research used NVIVO™. NVIVO™ is a software tool that assists in connecting concepts 
and perceived patterns that emerge.  
4 Findings 
Motives that lead to the creation of NCSS are arguably most fundamental to understanding why 
countries develop an NCSS. In this section, we describe our findings that synthesise the 64 documents 
from 54 countries. Findings are presented as two steps (Saldaña 2009). First cycle codes and their 
Research 
Question
• Why do countries 
create National 
Cyber Security 
Strategy?
Literatures
• NCSS 1
• NCSS 2
• ...
• NCSS n
First Cycle 
Coding
• Code 1
• Code 2
• ...
• Code n
Second Cycle 
Coding
• Theme 1
• Theme 2
• ...
• Theme n
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definitions are presented using descriptive codes (Section 3.1). These codes will then be abstracted into 
themes using pattern codes (Section 3.2). 
4.1 First Cycle Coding 
Each of the reviewed NCSS documents generally describes a national cyber security vision, pre-
requisite conditions, assumptions, and background that articulate unique attributes of each country’s 
cyber security strategy. In seeking to develop codes that enable description of these diverse motives 
nine codes were advanced: (1) Reducing Cyber Threats, (2) Economic Security, (3) Required by other 
policy instruments, (4) Strengthening National Resiliency, (5) Political Imperative, (6) Lawful 
Mandate, (7) Protecting State Secrets, (8) Strengthening Diplomacy, and (9) Increasing Country 
Image.  Table 4-1 summarises these codes, their definition and associated countries.  
Table 4-1 Coding Summary and Definitions of Cyber Security Motives by Countries 
Coding Aims of Motive/Countries* # 
Reducing 
Cyber Threats 
Definition: reducing the malicious conduct exercised in cyberspace that has possibility of 
action, or capacity to produce a cyber-attack (MOD 2013; NCESP 2011; PCM 2013).  
46 
Countries: AFG, AUS, BGD, BEL, CAN, CZE, COL, CYP, EGY, EST, FIN, FRA, GEO, DEU, 
GHA, ISL, IND, IRL, ISR, ITA, JPN, JOR, KEN, LVA, LTU, MUS, MNE, NLD, NZL, NGA, 
NOR, PAK, POL, QAT, RUS, RWA, SAU, SRB, ZAF, PRK, CHE, TTO, TUR, UGA, GBR, USA 
Economic 
Security 
Definition: an act of ensuring the confidence and trust of digital transaction in cyber 
space, and protecting the structure of national economy in the digital realm (AG 2009; 
MICT 2012; MPS 2010; NCKB 2015; SGDSN 2015; WH 2003) 
35 
Countries: AFG, AUS, AUT, BGD, CAN, CZE, COL, HRV, CYP, FIN, FRA, DEU, GHA, ISL, 
IND, IRL, ITA, JPN, JOR, KEN, LVA, MNE, MAR, NLD, NZL, NGA, NOR, POL, QAT, RUS, 
ZAF, ESP, TUR, GBR, USA 
Required by 
other policy 
instruments 
Definition: an official order to do something, which may be derived based on previous 
national agenda such as National Security Strategy, National Roadmap, formal request, or 
assessment. 
23 
Countries: AUT, COL, CYP, FIN, ISR, ITA, JPN, KEN, NLD, NGA, POL, QAT, RUS, SAU, 
SVK, ZAF, PRK, ESP, CHE, TTO, TUR, UGA, USA 
Strengthening 
National 
Resiliency 
Definition: an act to maintain the integrity of the uninterrupted operation and resilience 
of vital ICT services that have major importance and devastating impact to public at 
national level (BMI 2011; GARCIA 2012; IMCCS 2012; MEAC 2014; MOC 2014; MTMAC 
2013; SA 2011) 
17 
Countries: AUS, CZE, COL, HRV, FRA, GHA, JPN, NLD, NZL, RUS, RWA, SAU, SVK, ZAF, 
PRK, SGP, CHE, USA 
Political 
Imperative 
Definition: political imperative may be viewed as a broad rationale that incorporates the 
national interest (i.e. promoting national values, keeping country’s prosperity) or political 
situation (asserting democratic values, guaranteeing human rights, or ensuring free flow of 
information). 
20 
Countries: AUS, AUT, BGD, CAN, CZE, COL, EST, FRA, ITA, JPN, KEN, LTU, NLD, NZL, 
QAT, RUS, RWA, TUR, GBR, USA 
Lawful 
Mandate 
Definition: a condition of having an authoritative legal mandate to enforce law in cyber 
space.  
10 
Countries: COL, GHA, IND, MUS, NZL, NGA, PAK, RUS, TTO, TUR 
Protecting 
State Secrets 
Definition: the national information whose unauthorised disclosure could endanger 
national security, adapted from Merriam-Webster (2016b). 
7 
Countries: CZE, COL, JPN, NLD, NZL, RWA, ESP 
Strengthening 
Diplomacy 
Definition: the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations (Merriam-
Webster 2016c) 
5 
Countries: BEL, GEO, NLD, RUS, USA 
Increasing 
Country 
Image 
Definition: an impression of country looks or might look that presents to public   3 
Countries: GHA, JPN, TTO 
*Country abbreviation is based on three-letter country codes defined in ISO 3166-1 
Reducing Cyber Threats. A strong motivator to develop NCSS for the majority of countries is to 
address their vulnerability to cyber threats (N=46, see Table 4-1). The nature of these attacks may be 
sophisticated efforts sponsored by foreign governments or can be advanced by anonymous actors 
using cheap methods requiring little technical skills. Even so, these attacks can pose a great menace to 
a country, which is reflected in the high number of references to such cyber threats in country NCSS. 
These threats, can be categorized into two conditions: (1) stated-sponsored threat (i.e. cyber espionage, 
cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare), and (2) malicious activities (i.e. cyber-crime, hacktivism, large-
scale attacks, mismatch technology, development and security) (DEA 2012; H. A. M. Luiijf et al. 2013; 
PCM 2013). Cyber-threats need not be limited to international terrorism but is often linked to internal 
political activities. For example, Kenya recognises the threat of hacktivism “seeking to publicise 
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political view” as a factor that may influence local political interactions (MICT 2014). Similarly, Qatar 
recognises the risks of cyber space in “undermining social norms” (MICT 2013). 
Economic Security. As ICT has led to increasing growth in the digital economy (Jin and Cho 2015; 
Jorgenson and Vu 2016) issues of the national economy become entangled with cyber security. 
Therefore, most NCCS cite economic factors and the need to avoid potential disruptions to economic 
growth (N=35, see table 4-1). The protection of the digital economy includes factors, for example, such 
as: (1) ensuring the confidence and trust of digital transaction in cyber space, and (2) protecting the 
structure of national economy in the digital realm (AG 2009; MICT 2012; MPS 2010; NCKB 2015; 
SGDSN 2015; WHO 2003). Generating  trust and confidence in cyberspace protection, may attracts 
potential investors to the country (DCENR 2015; MCIT 2013a). Another reason is to sustain and 
enhance an efficient and secure digital environment is to promote stable economic growth and 
development which has significant implications for a country’s future prosperity (MPS 2010). 
Required by Other Policy Instruments. The creation of NCSS is often required by other social 
policy instruments (N=23, see Table 4-1). For example, national security strategies often identify the 
need to develop NCSS given the threats that cyber space poses to national security (DOD 2012; MOND 
2009). Other policy instruments are required by National Roadmaps to extend national plan in 
cyberspace such as ICT Master Plan, and National Development Plan (IMCCS 2012; MICT 2013, 2014; 
NCESP 2011; OCECPR 2012; WHO 2003). In both cases, it can be seen that there is a desire to align 
NCSS with security and national development plans. A third source from which NCSS is mandated is 
official reviews.  Official reviews are often carried out as a risk mitigation exercise strategy against 
known security breaches. For example, the Polish government partly based their periodic reviews of 
incidents reported by Poland’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) (MADISA 2013).  
Finally, the development of NCSS can also be invoked from of a formal request from legislation, 
resolution or presidential decree (GoJ 2015; GoS 2008; MCIT 2013b; MOD 2013; PCM 2013)). 
Strengthening National Resiliency. Strengthening resilience in cyber space is intended to 
maintain credible deterrents to cyber-attacks on national critical information infrastructure (CII). The 
CII represents a key enabler of vital ICT services that can have considerable knock-on effects should a 
cyber-attack prove successful (BMI 2011; GARCIA 2012; IMCCS 2012; MEAC 2014; MOC 2014; 
MTMAC 2013; SA 2011). Hence cyber-attacks on CII can have major national impacts leading this to 
become a significant motive for the creation of NCSS (N=18, see Table 4-1). In some countries, 
strengthening resiliency is aligned explicitly to improving defence capability representing a new area of 
military focus along with land, sea, and air. This is particularly evident in the NCSS of Belgium (ACOS 
STRAT 2014). Some countries use NCSS to address regional security tensions. For example, the 
Government of Georgia established their cyber security strategy after the Russian-Georgian war as a 
means to better engage military support for protection in cyberspace (DEA 2012). Similarly, South 
Korea and Japan demonstrate the use of NCSS to address regional tension in East Asia by creating 
rival cyber defence units (MOND 2009, pp. 18, 57).  
Political Imperative. Political imperatives were discovered as a motive in the creation of NCSS in 
some countries (N=20, see Figure 4-1). These political imperatives seek to establish a political agenda 
for nations in cyberspace.  For example, some countries outline an agenda that asserts the personal 
freedoms of citizens to enjoy access to information, freedom of expression as well as protection of 
human rights. For example, France seeks to establish national values and within cyber space in its 
NCSS (SGDSN 2015).  Similar sentiments are expressed by other countries such as Japan, Russia, 
United States (GoJ 2015; WHO 2003).  
Lawful Mandate. NCSS is used by countries to create a legal mandate in cyber space (N=10, see 
Figure 4-1). The underlining assumption is that cyberspace represents an extension in ‘space’ that 
requires protection. Therefore, the NCSS is aiming to provide a policy framework that enables legal 
authorities to take action such as monitoring suspicious activity, gathering evidence and prosecuting 
(MICT 2013). 
Protecting State Secrets. While some governments see merit in developing ICT infrastructure to 
enhance public service through e-government initiatives, there is recognition that this also poses risks 
in protecting sensitive information assets (N=7, see Figure 4-1). Thus, NCCS functions to guide the 
development of technical standards as well as align technological systems. Two motivations are found 
to dominate: those seeking to make e-government service more accessible (GoM 2013; MoD 2012a; 
NCESP 2011) and another which seeks to protect valuable government information from stated-
sponsored agency (i.e. cyber espionage), or from malicious activities (i.e. hacktivism) (GoJ 2015; GoR 
2011; MED 2011).  
Strengthening Diplomacy. Creating cyber security strategy can become a control centre for 
national diplomacy and security in cyberspace. Some countries see cyberspace as opening up new 
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opportunities for cyber diplomacy (BKA 2012; MoD 2012a) (N=5, see Figure 4-1). Cyber diplomacy 
aims to promote the peaceful use of the digital domain, strengthening partner relationship, or for 
conflict resolution (BKA 2012; NCSC 2013; WHO 2003). However, in other countries, having the 
NCSS is intended to create the cyber deterrence. Aligning military function with the cyber security 
strategy is envisioned to strengthen the military diplomacy (MOND 2009; WH 2011, p. 4). 
Promoting Country Image. Similar to increasing diplomacy, sometimes the creation of NCSS is 
intended to promote a country’s image (N=3, see Figure 4-1). Japan’s (ISPC 2013) NCSS is partly 
designed to show an image of Japan’s advanced cyberspace capabilities as well as being secure to 
attract investors and promote trust .While some seek to promote their image others seek to counter a 
negative image through a NCSS. The notorious image of Ghana as a source for cybercrime and money 
laundering, is countered through their adoption of a NCSS (FATF 2015; MOC 2014). 
By synthesising NCCS into several codes an understanding of the factors that have led to various NCSS 
can be seen. However, the range of codes now need to be distilled into themes, so that motives for NCS 
can be more generally understood. To provide this broad perspective of NCSSs, the next section will 
provide second cycle coding which uses “pattern coding”.   
4.2 Second Cycle of Coding: Themes of Cyber Security Strategy Motives  
Second cycle of coding seeks to reorganise and reanalyse data from first cycle coding, by further 
synthesising data by fitting one category with another (Saldaña 2009). In this section we develop 
themes which are derived from codes defined in Section 4.1. We group codes by its common concept 
and its similarity of concept using pattern coding (Saldaña 2009). Figure 4-1 presents the themes of 
NCCS motives. The cyber security strategy motives may be explained in themes National Security, 
Legal Remedy, and Politic.   
 
Figure 4-1 Coding Result – Cyber Security Motives, from Codes to Themes 
issue of national security. The codes of Reducing Cyber Threats, Protecting State Secrets, 
Strengthening National Resiliency, and Economic Security all can be grouped together because the 
intention of NCSS is to protect the safety, economic interests and the well-being of citizens and 
national institutions both public and private.  
Jurisprudence. The theme of jurisprudence addresses the need to create a credible legal foundation 
for governments to operate in cyberspace. The two codes of “required by other policy instruments” 
and “Lawful Mandate” both seek to define an appropriate legal context that enables legal authorities 
to reduce or eliminate actions in cyberspace that are harmful to a nation’s interests through the use 
courts of law, international tribunals and the like.   
Politics. The remaining motives of political imperative, strengthening diplomacy, and promoting 
country image, can be grouped under the theme of politics.  Here it can clearly be seen that cyber 
security strategy is used to promote a political vision and philosophy at the strategic and leadership 
level. Cyberspace is viewed in this context as a way to communicate national values to a wider 
international context.  
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 NCCS Motives: from National Security, to Jurisprudence, to Politic  
A wide spectrum of motives leading to the creation of NCSS has been recognized. Interestingly, these 
motives encompass more than the just obvious ones of national protection in cyberspace, but also 
jurisprudence and political will. Firstly, it is clear that for the great majority of countries the creation of 
NCSS underpins national security by countering cyber threats, protecting state secrets, strengthening 
national resiliency, or consolidating economic security. This motive is understandable since the 
internet is recognised for not only bringing advantages but also introducing distinguishable risks. 
National Security
• Reducing Cyber Threats
• Protecting State Secrets
• Strengthening National Resiliency to Critical Information Infrastructure
• Economic Security
Jurisprudence
• Requeired by other policy instruents
• Lawful Mandate
Politics
• Political Imperative
• Strengthening Diplomacy
• Promoting Country Image
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Accordingly, strengthening national security in cyberspace requires governments to deal with the 
nature of Internet technologies. This requires more than just dealing with currently known 
vulnerabilities but to also account for future innovations inside cyberspace. 
 The theme of jurisprudence outlines an important role for governments in regulating cyberspace. In 
view of the risks, governments view cyberspace as an extended jurisdictional space along with land, 
air, and sea which needs to be regulated to preserve national sovereignty. Jurisprudence in cyber space 
can take the form of the stand-alone laws or may be associated with other areas of policy such as in e-
commerce, e-government and e-health. Inevitably, seeking jurisprudence is fraught with complexities, 
due to two reasons. First, defining borders and jurisdiction in cyberspace is the subject of multiple 
interpretations. While some argue that cyberspace should remain borderless (Barlow 1996), others 
argue that cyberspace is an extension of national sovereignty (Cottim 2008; Finklea 2012; Tehrani and 
Manap 2013). Second, cyberspace is intertwined with realities of life within countries meaning that 
internet-age ideals of openness and free information flow clash with the realities of economics, politics 
and culture when defining appropriate laws and regulations (Klimburg 2012, pp. 35–42; OECD 2012). 
This leads to the third motive of the creation of cyber security strategy which are political ones.  
Political motives tend to develop from the perceptions of decision-makers and policy-makers which 
can change in response to prevailing circumstances, particularly perceived threats (Klimburg 2012, p. 
50). NCSS development in this context needs careful consideration of implications that flow from 
NCSS to the national interest. Politics is therefore perceived as an overarching motive that influences 
other areas of NCSS.  
In conclusion, the paper has outlined codes and themes of motives emerged from national cyber 
security strategies. Within the literature, the strategy becomes apparent: national cyber security 
strategy covers various perspectives on defining cyber security that are based on internal and external 
environment of the country called cyber security motives. Cyber security motives are the factors that 
lead to the creation of a nation’s cyber security vision and include pre-requisite conditions, 
assumptions, and background that generates the unique attributes of cyber security strategy.  
5.2 Limitation of Study 
Although this study seeks to clarify the range of factors that motivate the creation of cyber security 
strategy, the findings should be considered tentative. Codes and themes were collected and developed 
from existing NCSSs. While done in accordance with Scott & Glaser’s (1967) grounded methodology, 
the reliability of these themes becomes the subject for future research. 
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